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for the United States to agree by treaty or otherwise to the enforcement of foreign
awards on account of our dual system of sovereignty, state and federal, in which
each state has in the past determined its own arbitration law. A treaty naturally
would supersede local law, but query, would such a treaty be approved if state
opposition developed?
It may be noted that certain excellently prepared articles apparently have very
little application to international arbitration; for example, History of Commercial
Arbitrationin Englandand the UnitedStates, a Summary View, by William Catron
Jones, gives an excellent historical background of the local situation in England
and of the local legal development of arbitration in the United States, but there is
no particular tie-in to the international trade arbitration. The article by Pieter
Sanders, ArbitrationLaw in Western Europe, likewise is an excellent discussion of
the local legal situation in the states of Western Europe, but has very little relationship to international trade arbitration except to point out the diversity of the local
law and the resultant difficulty in obtaining enforcement of an award in a foreign
state.
Space does not permit mentioning and commenting on each of the articles;
however, each, in and of itself, is excellent. The authors are experts, in most
instances of world renown, in their particular fields. In reading this book one gets
the impression that the problems and the possibility of their immediate solution
are rather limited. If criticism can be directed at the editor, who has performed
a monumental effort in the editing of the articles that compose the volume, it
may be said that there is considerable repetition in the views expressed in articles
that are not necessarily under the same caption. It is apparent, however, that
this obviously could not be avoided in a book of this type where no one author
is attempting to paint the picture and a certain amount of over-lapping is bound
to occur. It would appear, however, that by and large the book offers much of
great value.
Martin J. Dinkelspiel*
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE.

By Carl Joachim Fried-

rich. Univ. of Chicago Press. 1958. Pp. x, 253. $4.75.
This book, by a distinguished political theorist, is a translation of an essay
published in a German encyclopaedia; the author's original purpose and intended
readers must be considered in appraising the present work. From the point of view
of the original production, the book is commendable. The author's erudition and
the fruits of his academic experience both in Europe and in this country, especially
at Harvard University, are manifest. But judged as a contribution to legal philosophy, the book falls far short of what one would expect from Professor Friedrich.
The book consists mainly of comments that seem to have occurred to the author
in the course of his reading in the field. These are often very acute and suggestive,
but they are not thorough elucidations of legal and political theories. The discussion of American legal philosophy is inexcusably scant, e.g., of the 229 pages, only
two or three are allocated to American writers. In a chapter entitled "The Revival
of Natural Law in Europe and America," there is a bare reference to Pound's
"social engineering" and not a single sentence deals with the revival of natural
law in this country, especially that since the last war. The distinctive and extremely important American contributions to the philosophy of an empirical
* Member, San Francisco Bar.
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science of law are ignored. European legal philosophers find much more significance
in American jurisprudence than is indicated in Professor Friedrich's brief references.
Perhaps the most helpful aspect of the book is the bringing together of problems which, in this country, are treated separately by legal philosophers and political theorists. Thus, Professor Friedrich discusses several important problems which
American legal philosophers are apt to neglect, e.g., constitutionalism, sovereignty,
consent as a basis of the validity of law, authority and legitimacy. Some of these
problems, to be sure, are discussed in other terms by legal philosophers. Although
Professor Friedrich's intention is a welcome antidote to the current specialization,
there remain many difficult problems to be studied before legal philosophy and
political theory can even begin to be unified.1
The author's effort to provide the outlines of a history of legal philosophy from
Plato to the present time is also highly commendable. Finally, it should be added
that Professor Friedrich's own philosophy, a rational and normative one with emphasis upon constitutional government, is significant and well summarized. The
reader will find many helpful references in the footnotes.
Jerome Hall*
Tim BILL OF RIGHTS. By Learned Hand. Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University
Press. 1958. Pp. 82. $2.50.
The winds of criticism-even of violent and vituperative criticism-have
blown about the United States Supreme Court throughout its history. The role
of the Court in interpreting and applying the Constitution has been the subject of
debate ever since the giants of Marshall and Jefferson squared off in opposite
corners. And the angry, intemperate language used by contemporary critics of the
segregation decisions is well within the bounds marked by historical precedent.
Most of the discussion of judicial review-the popular and the learned, the
practical and the academic-is strongly conditioned by the critic's approval or
disapproval of the legislation which the Court invalidates or refuses to invalidate.
Here again it is well within tradition to say that it all depends on whose ox is being
gored at the moment. Thus the denouncers of judicial review in the 1920s and 30s
have become its defenders in the 1950s, and vice versa-although many academicians have found it more comfortable to discover learned rationalizations to counter
the charge of inconsistency.
In the Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures for 1958, reprinted in the book under
review, Judge Learned Hand falls outside these traditional patterns. His discussion is lucid and temperate. His attack upon much of what has become traditional
judicial review appears to stem not from his personal reaction to the pattern of
decisions or the statutes which have been reviewed but from two separate factors.
In the first place, long experience as a judge has given him a genuine sense of
modesty about the role of judges in society. He appears to be saying something
like the following: I know that I am not especially equipped to decide the problems of public policy which come before the courts in the guise of judicial review.
I know that I cannot avoid bringing to the decision of such questions my own personal appraisal of the considerations underlying the statutes challenged. I do not
ICf. HAL., STruDns n¢ JURIspRUDENcE AND CRnNqAL THEoRY, ch. 4 (1958).
* Professor of Law, Indiana University.

